This paper explores how negative economic shocks affect household schooling decisions in the context of a developing country. In particular, we study the effect of parental job loss on child school dropout using data from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Our analysis focuses on Palestinian workers employed in Israel during the Second Intifada, a group of workers for whom job separation is arguably involuntary and determined by the intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To identify the effect, we employ an instrumental variable strategy and use the worker's exposure to conflict as a plausibly exogenous source of variation in job loss. Results show that parental job loss increases a child's probability of dropping out of school by 9 percentage points. The effect varies with the gender and the academic ability of the child, with the level of parental education, and the number of children in the household. As for the possible mechanisms explaining the result, we find evidence suggesting that the effect works through the job loss-induced reduction in household income. We do not find evidence of alternative mechanisms such as family disruption or household relocation.
Introduction
How do negative economic shocks affect household schooling decisions? To answer this question, we focus on one of the most traumatic economic shocks a household can experience, namely parental job loss, and explore its effect on child school dropout. This is a particularly relevant issue in developing countries. Where markets are not perfect, even temporary negative income shocks may have an immediate impact on household education choices. Moreover, in these contexts, the decision of withdrawing the child from school is more difficult to revert and, therefore, more likely to have permanent effects on the human capital accumulation process, with possibly large consequences on the child's future welfare.
There is extensive evidence that job loss has negative consequences on adults in terms of health and earnings (Farre et al., 2016, Schaller and Stevens, 2015; Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009 ). Yet, these effects can be particularly dramatic for children. The existing evidence indicates that parental job loss has long-run adverse effects on the child's level of human capital and future income (Hilger, 2016; Oreopoulos et al., 2008) . Furthermore, it affects children education outcomes also in the short-run. Recent research focusing on advanced countries shows that children exposed to parental job loss have higher probability of grade repetition (Stevens and Shaller, 2011) , lower grade-point average (Rege et al., 2011; Ruiz-Valenzuela, 2015) , and lower likelihood of enrolling at the university (Coelli, 2011) .
However, there is a lack of evidence on the effects of parental job loss on children education outcomes in developing countries. The reason for this lack of evidence is twofold. First, the panel data needed to analyze how parental job loss affects children's education are rarely available.
Second, finding a credibly exogenous source of variation in job loss -a central concern in this literature -is more difficult. To deal with the edogeneity issue, studies focusing on developed countries often used episodes of plant closures and mass layoff. However, these are hard to find in developing countries where employment in formal firms is small and cases of mass layoffs are very rare.
In this paper we investigate the causal effect of parental job loss on child school dropout in the context of a developing country, namely in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (hereafter OPT). The OPT offers a unique setting to this purpose. First, the rotating panel structure of the Palestinian survey data makes it possible to look at the immediate (i.e. between two consecutive quarters) employment and education status change for the household head and the child, respectively. Second, the peculiar situation of the Palestinian workers employed in Israel during the Second Intifada allows us to minimize the possibility that job loss is voluntary or related to some characteristics of the worker. 1 Two main pieces of evidence support the idea that job loss of Palestinian workers employed in Israel is largely involuntary and in fact related to conflict intensity. First, Palestinian workers employed in Israel have -ceteris paribus -a higher wage than those employed in the OPT and this difference has increased during the Second Intifada. Second, the dynamic of Palestinian employment in Israel during the Second Intifada closely follows conflict intensity with total employment significantly decreasing during more violent periods.
Our analysis considers a representative sample of Palestinian children in primary and secondary education whose household head is employed in Israel during the Second Intifada period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . This unique dataset is obtained by merging information from the Palestinian Labour Force Survey (PLFS) and a confidential dataset on children status and characteristics, both provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
To identify the effect of parental job loss on child school dropout, we implement an instrumental variable approach and use the geographical and time variation in Palestinian workers' exposure to conflict as a plausibly exogenous source of variation in job loss. We proxy worker's exposure to conflict using the intensity of conflict in the district of residence in a given quarter as measured by the per capita number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).
As for the relevance of the instrument, we argue that a higher conflict intensity may increase Palestinian worker's probability of losing the job in Israel for at least three different reasons.
First, it makes it more difficult for the Palestinian worker to reach the workplace in Israel, increasing absenteeism. Second, it may increase the level of the worker's psychological distress, possibly causing reduced productivity. Finally, it may induce Israeli employers to fire Palestinian workers in retaliation for conflict events occurred in the OPT. Our first-stage regression results indicate that conflict intensity is in fact a strong predictor of job loss for Palestinian workers employed in Israel.
The validity of our instrument for job loss relies on the assumption that it has no direct effects on child school dropout other than through the household head job loss (i.e. exclusion restriction assumption). We provide empirical evidence showing that conflict intensity is plau-sibly exogenous to child school dropout. First, we show that while conflict intensity increases school dropout probability for Palestinian children with household head employed in Israel, there is no effect for children with household head employed in the OPT. This indicate that we can plausibly rule out direct effects of fatalities on child school dropout. Intuitively, if conflict intensity has direct effects on school dropout of Palestinian children, then it should affectceteris paribus -all children regardless of whether their household head is employed in Israel or in the OPT. Second, we find that conflict intensity increases job loss probability only for Palestinian workers employed in Israel and not for those employed in the OPT, thus lending further support to our identifying assumption.
Our 2SLS estimates document a positive and significant effect of household head job loss on child school dropout. As for the magnitude of the effect, we find that household head job loss increases a child's probability of dropping out of school by 9 percentage points. This result is robust to a number of checks. These are the inclusion of: another proxy for conflict intensity, which may confound the effect of the number of fatalities; a large set of additional household head and household controls; non-linearities in both the control variables and the instrument.
The result is also robust to the use of alternative samples, of an alternative instrument, and to a falsification exercise in which we use randomly generated fatalities as a proxy for conflict intensity.
Next, we explore possible heterogeneity in the effect of parental job loss on child school dropout. We find that the effect varies with the gender and the academic ability of the child, and with the level of parental education and the number of children in the household. In particular, the effect is stronger for male children and students with lower academic ability. At the same time, it is larger for children with low educated household heads and children who are from numerous households. Finally, we examine the possible mechanisms behind our main result. We find evidence suggesting that the the effect of parental job loss on child school dropout works through the job loss-induced drop in household income. Instead, we do not find evidence of alternative mechanisms that have been explored in the literature, such as family disruption (i.e. parental divorce) or household residential relocation.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. The first is the literature on the effects of parental job loss on children education outcomes. Most of these studies focus on the longrun effects of job loss in developed countries and look at outcomes such as grade repetition, graduation point average, and likelihood of attending college (Stevens and Shaller, 2011; Rege et al. 2011; Coelli, 2009 ). Only two papers look at the effects of job loss on children schooling in developing countries. Skoufias and Parker (2006) find no effect of parental job loss on child schooling during the Mexico peso crisis. Duryea et al. (2007) show that during economic crises in Brazil father job loss is correlated with a higher child's probability of dropping out of school. Differently from these studies, our analysis explicitly addresses the endogeneity issue by adopting an instrumental variable approach. Our paper is also related to the literature on the economic determinants of child schooling. Previous research has shown the importance of child characteristics (age, gender, health), parental characteristics, and school quality (Alderman et al. 2001; Handa, 2002) . In particular, household income has been shown to be a key determinant of different schooling outcomes, including enrolment, test score, and attainment (Dostie and Jayaraman, 2006) . Our study contributes to this line of research by investigating how schooling investment decision responds to negative (even if temporary) economic shocks affecting households in a developing country.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a background on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, in particular, on the Second Intifada. Section 3 describes the data used in the econometric analysis. In section 4, we present the econometric model, discuss some descriptive evidence, and turn to the identification strategy. In section 5, we present our main results, the robustness checks, and the heterogeneity analysis. Finally, we discuss a number of possible mechanisms explaining our main results. Section 6 concludes.
Background

Palestinian workers in Israel and the Second Intifada
Employment of Palestinians in Israel dates back at least to 1967, when -after the Six-day war -Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Since then, a large proportion of Palestinian workers (in some periods up to 25% of the population) have been employed in Israel, mainly to supply labor services in the construction, manufacturing, and agriculture sectors (Angrist, 1996) .
As a consequence of the dependence on the Israeli economy, the dynamic of the Palestinian labor market has always been influenced by the amount of job opportunities in Israel (Kadri and MacMillen, 1998) . During the years, the number of Palestinian workers employed in Israel has responded to major political events, such as the First Palestinian Uprising (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) , but also to changes in Israeli regulations of work permits and security policies. The possibility to be employed in Israel has always been subject to holding a work permit and Palestinian workers have to commute daily because regulations prohibit them from staying overnight in Israel. 2 Yet, by the late 1990s, more than one-fifth of the Palestinian labour force was employed in Israel, accounting for one sixth of Palestinian national income (Ruppert Bulmer, 2003) . Being employed in Israel was very attractive for Palestinian workers: ceteris paribus, wages in Israel were significantly higher, between 10% and 25% (International Monetary Fund, 2003; World Bank, 2004; Mansour, 2010) . In September 2000, after some years of relative stability, the security situation rapidly deteriorated and the Second Intifada (the so-called al-Aqsa Intifada) started. 3 In the following months, there was a rapid increase in violent events from both side of the conflict. The Israeli Government adopted a number of security measures, including the limitation of the movement of Palestinians within and outside the OPT. 4 As a result of the conflict situation, the number of workers commuting to Israel dropped sharply. Moreover, the conflict reduced Palestinian wages in the OPT, Palestinian employment in Israel, and increased job separation for Arab-Israeli in Israel (Di Maio and Nandi, 2013; Miaari et al. 2012; Cali and Miaari, 2013; Abrahams, 2015; Adnan, 2015) . Between 2000 and 2006, Palestinians killed 234 Israeli civilians and 226 IDF personnel in the OPT while the IDF caused more than 4,000
Palestinian fatalities, the majority of them non-combatants (B'TSELEM, 2007).
The Palestinian school system during the Second Intifada
Since the 1994 Oslo Accord, the education system in the OPT is managed by the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE). The academic year begins in September and ends in June. The education system is divided into two levels: primary (including elementary school and middle school) (grades 1 to 10) and secondary (grades 11 to 12). Grades 1 to 10 are compulsory, implying that all Palestinian children between 6 and 15 years old are expected to be in school. Instead, grades 11 and 12 are not mandatory. At the end of the 2 To obtain work permits for Palestinian workers, Israeli employers submit petitions to the Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor. Work permits are issued subject to security screening of each Palestinian employee. Among the conditions to obtain the permit, there is to be married and have at least one child (Berda, 2012) .
3 There is no established ending date for the Second Intifada. However, violence between IDF and Palestinians decreased substantially after 2006. Jaeger and Paserman (2008) provide detailed description of the different periods of violence during the Second Intifada.
4 These limitations include: a reduction in the number of work permits issued to Palestinians, a change of rules to get work permits (from a system based on age and marital status to individual permits), curfews imposed on Palestinian cities, internal and external borders closures, and the building (started in 2002) of a separation wall between Israel and the West Bank. (World Bank, 2004; United Nations, 2005) . secondary school, student take a final exam (Tawjihi General Examination) which is required to access the university (UNESCO, 2007) The Palestinian society places a high value on education. This is reflected in enrolment and attendance rates which are high by regional and global standards (PCBS, 2006; Sharek Youth Foundation, 2009 ). The high value placed on schooling extends also to girl education.
Gender participation rates show perfect equality in education access for both primary and secondary school (50.4% and 51.7%, respectively). Gender-based participation levels are broadly equivalent in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where 54.5% and 52.3% of the students are female, respectively.
Differently from what usually happens in conflict-affected countries, the education system in the OPT continued to operate during the Second Intifada (Nicolai, 2007) . For instance, some school construction took place and a new Palestinian curriculum was implemented in those years (PCBS, 2006) . However, as any other aspect of the Palestinian economy, also the education system has faced numerous difficulties. Schools have been damaged and occupied by the IDF. Teachers and students have been victim of violent events (World Bank, 2004; United Nations, 2005; MoEHE and UNESCO, 2005) . Military-imposed mobility restrictions -such as checkpoints and physical barriers -made more difficult to reach the schools. School days have been lost or shortened because of security reasons (Brueck et al., 2016) . At the same time, explicit and implicit costs of schooling have increased. Due to the difficult general economic situation, school fees -while far from being prohibitive -have become to be hardship for an increasing number of families (Nicolai, 2007) . 5 Indirect costs of attending school -such as food, books, transportation prices -have rised as well (IMF, 2003; WFP and FAO, 2007) . Yet, the aggregate number of students enrolled ihas not decreased during the conflict period. In fact, between 2000 and 2006, the total number of Palestinian students in basic education increased from 830,765 to 944,713. Education attendance increased from 95% to 98% for 6-11 years old, from 96% to 97% for 12-14 years old, and from 74% to 85% for 15-17 years old. 6 5 Although education is officially free in the OPT, students traditionally contribute with a donation -effectively a school fee. These fees form some 50 per cent of schools' budgets and are needed to make the schools continue to operate (Nicolai, 2007) 6 Data taken from the PCBS website http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/ Education-1994-2013-09E.htm.
Data
Labour force survey and children data Our main source of data is the Palestinian Labour Force Survey (PLFS) administered by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).
The PLFS is a quarterly representative household survey of Palestinians living in the OPT (West Bank and Gaza Strip) collecting data on individuals aged at least 16, which is the minimum working age in the OPT. The PLFS is a rotating quarterly panel where households are surveyed four times over six quarters: they are surveyed for two consecutive quarters, dropped in the next two quarters, and then surveyed again for two consecutive quarters. Although the survey is not designed for longitudinal analysis, the rotating design makes it possible to match individuals across waves. To construct our dataset, we combine the PLFS data for the Second Intifada period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) with additional confidential information -not available in the publicly available PLFS -on children aged 10-15 for the same period. To consider both students in compulsory and non compulsory grades (before university), our final sample includes all Palestinian children aged 10-17 who, at the time of the first interview, are attending school and whose household head is working in Israel. 7 The rotating panel structure of the PLFS allows us define our two main variables of interest (Household job loss and Child school dropout) as the employment and the education status change between two consecutive quarters for the household head and the child, respectively. Finally, to complement our analysis, we use information from the Child Labour Survey administered by the PCBS in 2004. While data are available only for one year, the survey provides detailed information on parental and household characteristics, including household income and the marital status of parents.
Conflict events data Data on conflict-related Palestinian fatalities during the Second Intifada are provided by the Israeli NGO B'TSELEM (B'TSELEM, 2007) . The B'TSELEM dataset provides a rich set of information, such as age, gender and place of residence of the killed, the date, place, and a description of the circumstances of the event. Data are based on a number of sources and validated by several cross-checks. For this reason, they are considered to be accurate and reliable by both the Israelis and the Palestinians and have been previously used by other scholars studying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see for instance Amodio and Di 7 By censoring the sample at the age of 17 (the age at which students are assumed to be enrolled in the last year of secondary education), we are considering the most conservative sample allowing for the inclusion of both primary and secondary students. Adding 18 years old students (which by definition are grade repeaters) to the sample strengthens our main result (see Section 5.3). Maio, 2017; Mansour and Reis, 2012; Jaeger and Paserman, 2008) . In our analysis, we measure conflict intensity using the district-level number of Palestinians fatalities caused by the IDF per 10,000 inhabitants by quarter. We also use additional data on other military-motivated security measures implemented by the IDF, namely the external border closures. During closure days movements of workers and goods between the OPT and Israel, as well as between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, are completely banned since all permits previously issued to residents of the OPT for purposes of work, trade, or medical treatment are invalid. Data on the yearly number of closure days of the border between Israel and the OPT are also provided by B'TSELEM. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables included in the analysis.
Our sample includes 9539 Palestinian children who are attending school and have the household head employed in Israel at the time of the first interview. Child school dropout is a dummy taking value 1 if the child attends school in quarter t (the time of the first interview) but not in quarter t + 1 (the time of the second interview). Dropout students are 1.3% of our sample (4% if we consider those in secondary school). This is not surprising since -as discussed in Section 2, the education system in the OPT is characterized by an extremely high education attendance rate (as high as 95% for primary education). As for the children characteristics, the sample is balanced with respect to the gender of the child. The average age of child is 12 and the mean years of schooling 6.3. Household head job loss is a dummy taking value 1 if the household head is employed in Israel in quarter t (the time of the first interview) but not in quarter t + 1 (the time of the second interview). The data show that job loss is a quite frequent event during the Second Intifada for Palestinian employed in Israel: 34% of workers loses the job in Israel between two quarters. As for household head education, 62% have completed at least primary education, 20% secondary education, and 7% tertiary education. More than 85% of Palestinian workers in Israel are employed in the private sector, 11% are self-employed and 2% employed in the public sector. As for the household characteristics, the average household size is of 8 members, the average number of children in the household is 3, and the number of people employed in the household other than the household head is 2. Fatalities -our proxy for conflict intensity -is the number of Palestinian fatalities per 10,000 inhabitants by district and quarter: the mean is 0.36 and the variance 0.58. Conflict intensity is characterized by large variation across district and time as shown in the maps in Figure A .1 where districts of the OPT are classified according to the quantile they belong to in the distribution of the quarterly level number of Palestinian fatalities.
------[ Table 1 here] ------4 Empirical analysis 4.1 Descriptive evidence As a first step in our empirical analysis, we investigate the correlation between child school dropout and parental job loss. Our sample includes Palestinian children who are attending school and have the household head employed in Israel at the time of the first interview. We estimate the following regression model:
where Dropout ihjt is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if child i in household h from district j attends school in quarter t (the time of the first interview) and does not attend school in quarter t + 1 (the time of the second interview). JobLoss hjt is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the child's household head is employed in Israel in quarter t (the time of the first interview) and is not employed in Israel in quarter t + 1 (the time of the second interview). The set of controls includes: (i) child characteristics (gender, age, and years of schooling) grouped in matrix X ihjt ; (ii) household head characteristics (age, age squared, a set of dummy variables for the education level, and a set of dummies for the employment status, i.e. regular employee, irregular employee, self-employed); and household characteristics (size, number of children, and number of people employed other than the household head) grouped in matrix W hjt ; (iii) district fixed-effects grouped in vector θ j ; (iv) quarter fixed-effects grouped in vector λ t . Finally, ihjt is the error term.
Results are reported in Table 2 . The baseline specification in column 1 shows that household head job loss is significantly positively correlated with child school dropout. From column 2 to 4, we progressively add to the baselines specification the set of controls for child, household head, and household characteristics, respectively. The magnitude of the coefficient remains stable across specifications and significant at least at the 10% level.
------[ Table 2 here] ------These results highlight a positive relationship between child school dropout and parental job loss. However, they are likely uninformative about the direction of causality of this relationship. Parents of children who drop out from school may have different (observable and unobservable) characteristics with respect to parents of children who do not drop out. Any unobserved characteristic correlated with both household head job loss and child school dropout would thus potentially confound the effect of the former on the latter. In such case, the OLS estimate of β 1 in regression (1) would be biased.
Identification strategy
The objective of our analysis is to estimate the causal effect of parental job loss on child school dropout. To this end, the choice of focusing on Palestinian workers employed in Israel during the Second Intifada is a convenient one because it provides us with a sample of individuals for whom it is arguably minimal the possibility that job separation is voluntary. In fact, there are at least two pieces of evidence supporting the idea that job loss for Palestinian workers in Israel is largely involuntary and in fact related to intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
First, there is a substantial wage premium for Palestinian workers employed in Israel and that has increased during the conflict period. Our data indicate that, before and during the Second Intifada, wages of Palestinian workers employed in Israel are on average 15% higher than wages of Palestinian workers employed in the OPT, keeping constant education level, employment sector, and type of occupation. Moreover, our data indicate that during the Second Intifada the real wage of Palestinians workers employed in Israel for two consecutive quarters increases by 3% on average, while Palestinians moving from a job in Israel to one in the OPT suffer a 34% real wage drop in the second quarter. Second, the dynamic of Palestinian workers employment in Israel closely follows conflict intensity. Data from the PLFS show that in 1999 (before the Second Intifada started), almost 25% of Palestinian working population is employed in Israel. In 2006, at the end of the conflict, the percentage is around 10%. Moreover, there is some evidence of an increase in ethnicity-based firing behaviour by Israeli employer during the Second Intifada. Miaari et al. (2012) show that the conflict negatively affects Arab-Israeli (who are Israeli citizen) employed in Israel increasing the probability of (non-voluntary) job separation. A fortiori, we expect this type of discriminatory firing to affect Palestinian workers employed in Israeli firms. 8
Taken together, this evidence suggests that job loss for Palestinian workers employed in Israel is unlikely to be voluntary but it is instead a consequence of higher conflict intensity.
To identify a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the job loss of Palestinian workers employed in Israel, we therefore use their different exposure to conflict. In particular, we use the cross-district variation in the number of Palestinian killed by the IDF in the worker's district of residence in each quarter over the period 2000 to 2006 as an instrumental variable for job loss.
We estimate the following first-stage regression:
where F atalities jt is defined as the number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) per 10,000 inhabitants in the household head's district of residence in quarter t (the time of the first interview). The coefficient of α 1 thus measures the conflict-induced increase in the likelihood that a worker who is employed in Israel in quarter t is no longer employed in Israel in quarter t + 1. As in model 1, X ihjt is a matrix including the controls for child characteristics while W hjt is a matrix including characteristics of the household head and of the household.
Vector θ j includes the set of district fixed-effects, and λ t the set of quarter fixed-effects. Lastly, µ idjt is the error term. In our robustness checks, we also include district-specific time trends to account for any district-level time varying characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, the level at which conflict intensity is measured. This allows the errors to be serially correlated and also to be correlated for all children in the same district in a given quarter. 9
Discussion of the instrument
Relevance of the instrument Our estimation strategy is based on the hypothesis that the exposure to higher conflict intensity (as proxied by per-capita number of Palestinian killed by the IDF in the district of residence of the worker) increases the probability of job loss for a Palestinian worker employed in Israel. We expect this to happen for at least three reasons. First, a higher conflict intensity makes it more difficult for Palestinian workers employed in Israel to outside labor market options for Arabs which makes them more attached to their Isreaeli employers.
reach their workplace. 10 For instance, the higher the conflict intensity the more likely is that the IDF put in place security measures to control the territory. These security measures make the travel time to become highly uncertain, increasing the likelihood of episodes of days late or absenteeism (Abrahams, 2015; Cali and Miaari, 2013; World Bank, 2004) . Second, the higher the conflict intensity the higher the probability for the worker of being exposed to violent events, and thus the higher the insecurity and fear feelings. Experiencing this continuous tension may cause psychological distress and reduced productivity, possibly leading to the worker's layoff (Ayer at al., 2015) . 11 Finally, a higher conflict intensity in the district of residence of the worker may be interpreted by the Israeli employer as a proxy for the probability of the worker's involvement in violent actions against the IDF. Under this scenario, a higher conflict intensity may increase the likelihood that the Israeli employers fire Palestininan workers in retaliation (Miaari et al., 2012) .
Validity of the instrument The validity of F atalities jt as an instrument for Jobloss hjt in equation (2) relies on the assumption that conflict intensity has no direct effects on child school dropout other than through the household head job loss (exclusion restriction assumption).
There is both aggregate and individual evidence supporting this assumption. To begin, aggregate data for the whole OPT show that enrolment and attendance have not decreased during the Second Intifada in primary or secondary grades (see Section 2.2). This suggests that conflict intensity is not among the main determinants of schooling decision in the OPT and that the conflict -even if made it more difficult and possibly dangerous to physically reach the schools -is not associated with school dropout for the whole of the Palestinian student population.
To provide further empirical support to the exclusion restriction assumption, we run two tests using individual-level data. First, we test whether, ceteris paribus, the impact of the number of fatalities on child school dropout differs depending on whether the household head is employed in Israel or in the OPT at the time of the first interview. If there are direct effects of conflict intensity on child school dropout, we should observe the former to play a role on 10 Palestinian workers employed in Israel commute daily because they are not authorized to spend the night in Israel (see Section 2.1).
11 Ayer at al. (2015) presents an extensive review of the literature on the psychological aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conclusions indicate that increased exposure to the latter may have detrimental effects on a broad range of psychological outcomes. In particular, nearly all studies looking at functional impairment (i.e. the inability to carry out functions related to work, education, or relationships) found that the latter was more severe for individuals more exposed to political conflict and violence. the latter no matter where the child's household head is employed. 12 Results are reported in the upper panel of Table 3 . A higher number of fatalities increases the probability of school dropout for children with household head employed in Israel (column 1), while it does not affect children with household head employed in the OPT (column 2), with the difference between the coefficients being statistically significant at 5%. 13 Second, we test whether conflict intensity has a different effect on the job loss probability of Palestinian workers employed in Israel or in the OPT. Results reported in the lower panel of Table 3 show that the number of fatalities positively affects the probability of losing the job for workers employed in Israel but it has no effect for workers employed in the OPT -with the difference between the two coefficients being statistically significant at 1%. Taken together, these results suggest that we can plausibly exclude the existence of omitted variables potentially correlated with both the number of fatalities and school dropout for children exposed to parental job loss. Also, these results possibly rule out direct effects of conflict intensity on child school dropout, thus providing empirical support to our identifying assumption that the number of fatalities is uncorrelated with child school dropout other than through the effect on household head job loss.
------[ Table 3 here] ------Finally, we note that a possible concern with our identification strategy is that workers may decide to relocate in districts less exposed to the conflict. This geographical sorting might lead to biased estimates of the effect of parental job loss. If, for instance, high-skilled workers move towards districts with lower number of fatalities, then our estimates would be biased upward. To begin, we note that in the case of the Second Intifada the possibility of relocation was extremely limited (see for instance, World Bank, 2007) . 14 In fact, after the outbreak of the Second Intifada internal migration has been "very negligible" [PCBS (2009), p. 93] and the percentage of Palestinian who migrated decreased for all age groups. Interestingly, the main motivations for internal migration during the period under analysis is marriage (PCBS, 2009).
These results suggests that household relocation should not be a threat to our identification strategy. To provide additional evidence to this argument, we use our data to test whether the number of fatalities is associated with compositional effects at the district level. 15 In particular, we regress the household head's level of education, averaged by district, on the district-level number of fatalities, using a panel regression with district and time fixed effects. Results (reported in Appendix Table A .1) indicate that there are no compositional effects associated with conflict intensity, thus strengthening our confidence on the validity of the number of Palestinian fatalities as an instrumental variable for job loss. Table 4 column 1 reports the results for the first-stage regression (equation 2). The estimated effect of F atalities jt on JobLoss hjt is positive and highly significant. This implies that the higher is the intensity of conflict exposure for a Palestinian worker employed in Israel -as measured by the number of fatalities occurred in the district of residence -the higher is the probability of job loss. As for the magnitude, one additional fatality in 10,000 inhabitants leads to an increase in the worker's probability of job loss by 5.3 percentage points. 16 The corresponding reduced-form results presented in column 2 confirm that the exposure to conflict does increase child school dropout probability. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient indicates that one additional fatality in 10,000 inhabitants is associated to a 0.5 percentage point increase in the child's probability of dropping out of school.
Results
First stage
------[ Table 4 here] ------As a robustness check, we estimate the first-stage regression (equation 2) including as additional controls the (per-capita) district-level number of fatalities occurred in quarter after the first interview and those occurred in the quarter before that. Results are shown in Table   5 , where column 1 reports the baseline first-stage result for ease of comparison (from Table 4 15 Ideally, one would like to check if the household changes district of residence between t and t + 1. The PLFS does not allow for this test since it does not track households changing residential location. 16 Given that the mean of our dependent variable is 0.341, one additional fatality in 10,000 inhabitants leads to an average increase in the probability of job separation by 15.5 percent [(0.053/0.341)=0.155]. Note that the coefficient for the number of fatalities is larger than that reported in Table 3 for Palestinian workers employed in Israel (column 1). The reason is the more restrictive definition of the job loss status used there: to allow for the comparison between the two groups in Table 3 (those employed in Israel and those employed in the OPT at the time of the first interview), the job loss status does not apply to workers who lose the job in Israel but get re-employed in the OPT in the next quarter. column 1). Results in column 2 indicate that the effect of fatalities occurred in the quarter after the interview is small and not significant while the effect of current quarter fatalities (those at the time of the first interview, i.e. our proxy for conflict intensity) is only slightly reduced and remains significant at 5%. This result is reassuring as for our main result since including the fatalities in the next quarter after the first interview (when the status change for both the household head and the child -if any -has already occurred) makes this specification a sort of placebo test. Column 3 shows that the effect of current quarter fatalities is also robust to controlling for previous quarter fatalities. Interestingly, this latter result together with the fact that the errors are clustered at the district level suggest that the possibility of serial correlation is not a concern for our analysis. Finally, as an additional robustness check, we estimate the first-stage regression computing the standard errors via bootstrapping (Cameron et al., 2008) .
The level of significance of the estimates is unaffected (results available upon request).
------[ Table 5 here] ------ Table 6 presents our main results. The coefficients reported in the first row are the secondstage estimates of the effect of household head job loss on child's probability of dropping out of school. Column 1 reports the specification which includes only the fixed effects. In columns 2-4, we add a number of additional control variables for child, household head, and household characteristics. These estimates document a positive and significant effect of household head job loss on child school dropout, which remains fairly stable across different model specifications.
Second stage
In particular, looking at the more demanding specification (column 4), we find that parental job loss increases a child's probability of dropping out of school by 9 percentage points. 17
It is worth noting that the 2SLS estimates are larger than the OLS estimates reported in Table 2 . In our analysis, the compliers are the children whose household head got separated 17 Note that, while the effect of household head job loss on child school dropout is highly significant and the magnitude large, the absolute number of affected children is small due to the low dropout rate (1.3% for the whole sample, 4% for students in secondary school, see Table 1 ). This may suggest a limited economic relevance for our results. Yet, two elements suggest that this is not the case. First, our analysis employs the most restrictive definition of dropout, i.e. that occurring between two consecutive quarters. In fact, this is a choice imposed by the nature of our main dataset. While the semi-panel structure of our data allows us to precisely identify immediate effects, it limits the possibility to look for -probably larger -retarded and longer-run ones. Second, as discussed in Section 2, education attendance in the OPT is very high. In this sense, the OPT is a tough test for studying the effect of household job loss on child school dropout and our results should thus be interpreted as indicating the potentially important role of the former even when the latter is a rare event and preference for education is very strong. from their job in Israel because of the conflict. The always-takers are those children who would have been exposed to parental job loss even in the absence of conflict (some household head may have decided to voluntarily leave the job, some others may have incurred in job separation for reasons other than the conflict). The estimated coefficient of β 1 is higher for the compliers: this is the group for which job loss can be particularly traumatic as it comes as unanticipated and involuntary, and it is more likely to be permanent. It follows that the coefficient we identify with our instrument can be interpreted as a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE).
------[ Table 6 here] ------
Robustness checks
As a first robustness check, we account for other potential aspects of the conflict, which may represent confounding factors in our analysis and can be used as alternative proxies for conflict intensity. As discussed in Section 2, the IDF has used several different security-motivated military measures during the Second Intifada. One of the most important of such measures is the closure of borders between Israel and the OPT. During closure days, Palestinian workers employed in Israel are forbidden to leave the OPT and thus cannot reach their workplace, potentially increasing the probability of job loss. Since the number of closure days varies only at the country level (IDF's decision to close the borders affect all the OPT districts at the same time and in the same way) its effect is already controlled for in our main regression by the time fixed effects. Yet, it is possible that the effect of closures depend on how far the place of residence of the worker is from the Israeli border. For this reason, we augment our main regression by including the number of closure days interacted with the distance between the capital of the worker's district of residence and the closer entry point in Israel. The coefficient for this variable is negative -suggesting that the effect of closure days on the probability of job loss is smaller for workers living farer from the borders -but it is never significant. As shown in Table 7 column 2 (column 1 reports our baseline result), the magnitude of F atalities jt is unchanged.
Second, we check that our results are robust to the inclusion of a number of additional covariates. These are: 1) full set of household head occupation dummies 18 ; 2) full set of household head industry of employment dummies 19 ; and 3) number of other children in the household attending school. In Table 7 column 3-5, we add each of these variables to the main specification. Finally, in column 6 we include district-specific time trends. Results show that the coefficient of F atalities jt is remarkably robust and always significant at 5%. 20 ------[ Table 7 here] ------Third, we check that our results are robust to non-linearities in both the control variables and in the instrument. Non-linearities in the controls are addressed by including the quadratic terms of all continuous control variables and all the two-way interactions between the dummy control variables. Results reported in Table A .2 column 1 indicate that the effect of household head job loss slightly increases with respect to the baseline. We also consider the possibility of non-linearities in the instrument used in the first-stage regression. To test for this, we include the quadratic term of F atalities jt as additional instrument in equation 2. Also in this case, the results are virtually unchanged (see column (2) Table A.2).
Next, we redo all our analysis using an alternative instrument, namely the predicted probability of household head job loss obtained from a probit model of JobLoss hjt on F atalities jt and all controls. This is expected to increase the precision of the estimated coefficient of interest, given that the variable to be instrumented is a dummy. All our results are unchanged when using this alternative instrumental variable (detailed results are reported in Table A .3).
Morevoer, we implement a falsification exercise to test whether 'randomly generated' values for the number of fatalities produce point-estimates close to the 'true' one. If this was the case, the null hypothesis that the coefficient of F atalities jt is equal to zero would be erroneously rejected. As shown in Figure A .2, the point-estimates generated in the falsification test are normally distributed with mean zero. 21 This indicates that there is no correlation between the number of fatalities and household head job loss when the former are randomly assigned.
As a final check, we re-estimate our model using different samples. First, we consider 19 These are: a) agriculture; b) manufacturing; c) construction; d) commerce, hotels, and restaurants; e) transport, storage, and communication; f) services. 20 As discussed in Section 4.2, as a robustness check to account for the small number of cluster, we also compute the p-values using wild bootstrapping. The effect remains significant at 10% (results available upon request).
21 Figure A .2 depicts the probability density function of the coefficients of F atalitiesjt obtained by estimating the first-stage regression with the 'random' fatalities as independent variable and iterating 10,000 times. The vertical line indicates our 'true' point-estimate (0.053), which is reported in column (1) of Table 4 . 'Random' fatalities are generated in the following way. For each iteration, we take the 'true' number of quarterly fatalities occurred during the Second Intifada and we randomly re-assign them to the district-quarter pairs. This implies that in each artificially (randomly) generated Second Intifada the total number of fatalities is equal to the real one but its district-quarter distribution is instead random. only those in mandatory grades, i.e. which have not completed grade 10, irrespective of the age. Second, we add to our main sample also those aged 18 and 19, to be sure to include also students that are in the last year of secondary school but have repeated one or more grades.
In both case, our 2SLS estimates do not change in magnitude and become significant at 1% (results available upon request).
Heterogeneity
Child characteristics
The effect of parental job loss on child school dropout is heterogeneous as for the gender and the academic performance of the child. The reduced form estimates are reported in Table   8 . Column 1 and 2 show the results when we look separately at boys and girl: the effect of household head job loss is significant for the former group but not for the latter, and the difference between the two is significantly different from zero at 5%. These results are in line with the fact that -as discussed in Section 2 -households in the OPT, differently from what happens in other developing countries, value very much girl education (MoEHE, 2006; Nicolai, 2007) . These results are also consistent with the fact that child labour -a possible household strategy to cope with a negative economic shock -is an option only for boys in the context of the OPT (Di Maio and Nandi, 2013) . We elaborate more on this point in Section 5.5 where we discuss the possible mechanisms behind our main result.
Next, we explore whether the effect of parental job loss on child school dropout depends on the previous academic performance of the child. Results in columns 3 and 4 show that the effect of job loss on school dropout is high and significant for children who repeated at least one grade while it is not significant for those who never repeated a grade, with the difference between the two coefficients being significantly different from zero at 1%. This indicates that household head job loss is more likely to induce the household to withdraw the child from school if his/her academic performance is low, i.e. the expected returns to schooling are lower.
Finally, we do not find evidence of a differential effect for children in compulsory grades versus those who have completed mandatory education (results available upon request). 22 This indicates that parental job loss does increase school dropout not only for children in voluntary grades but also for those in lower grades, i.e. those for whom dropout is likely to be more harmful because it leads to a very early interruption of the process of human capital accumulation.
------[ Table 8 here] ------
Household characteristics
The effect of parental job loss on child school dropout also varies with the level of parental education, the number of children in the household, and the number of employed members in the household. Reduced form results are reported in Table 9 . Column 1 and 2 show the results when we split the sample according to level of education of the household head. Our results indicate that the effect of parental job loss is significant for children whose household head has at most primary education while there is no effect for children whose household head has secondary or higher education, with the difference between the two coefficients being statistically different from zero at 1%. This suggests that the household's response to negative economic shocks may depend on how parents value education. At the same time, this result is in line with numerous previous studies showing that parental schooling is positively associated with better education outcomes for the child (Orazem and King, 2008) .
Our results also show that the effect of parental job loss also varies depending on the composition of the household. Using as threshold the average household number of children in the OPT (3 children), columns 3 and 4 show that the effect of parental job loss is significant only for large households while it is not significant for smaller ones, with the difference between the two being significantly different from zero at 5%.
------[ Table 9 here] ------
Mechanisms
Our results document a large and significant effect of household head job loss on child school dropout. Yet, there are different possible explanations for this effect. We focus on three main mechanisms, all related to the possible effects of parental job loss on household characteristics: 1) reduction in household income; 2) family distress, e.g. parental divorce; and 3) household residential relocation.
Household income
Household income is a key determinant of household decision concerning investment in education. Previous research has shown that higher household income is associated with better child education outcomes, including enrollment, test score, and attainment (Behrman and Knowles, 1999; Dostie and Jayaraman, 2006) .
In the case of the Palestinian workers employed in Israel, providing a precise measure of household income is very challenging. The PLFS does not report the household income and thus the latter needs to be constructed from individual wages. This implies a large number of missing values due to the large number of households with members who are self-employed (and thus do not declare a wage). Moreover, less than one-third of the members who are employee report the wage in two consecutive quarters, significantly reducing the sample and making the estimation very imprecise. Table 10 report the reduced form results of the effect of conflict intensity -as proxied by F atalities jt -on household income for our sample of Palestinian workers employed in Israel. To overcome the data limitation, we measure household income using different alternative strategies. In column 1, we minimize the noise in the household income variable by proxing it with a dummy taking value 1 if the household suffers an income loss, i.e. household income decreases between quarter t (the time of the first interview) and quarter t + 1 (the time of the second interview), and zero otherwise. Results show that conflict intensity increases households' probability of suffering an income loss, though the effect is not significant at conventional levels. In column 2, we perform the same analysis using a household income loss variable constructed by imputing the missing values for wages. 23 The effect of conflict on the household income loss probability is positive and significant at 5%. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that one additional fatality in 10,000 inhabitants is associated with a 5.3 percentage point increase in the household's probability of suffering an income loss between two consecutive quarters (i.e. between the first and the second interview). Finally, in column 3, we proxy household income loss using the (log) value of the reduction in the (actual and imputed) wages of the household members. Results indicate that one additional fatality in 10,000 inhabitants reduces household income by 16%. This evidence of a conflict-induced drop in household income for those employed in Israel suggests that -for the very same group -changes in household income could be a potential mechanism explaining why household head job loss increases child school dropout.
------[ Table 10 here] ------To provide additional support to this argument, we split the sample according to the number of employed members in the household other than the household head. Reduced form results reported in Table 11 indicate that the effect of household head job loss increases child school dropout only if the number of employed members in the household other than the household head is equal or less than 2 (i.e. the average value for this variable in our sample), with the difference between the coefficients for the two samples being statistically different from zero at 10%. One possible interpretation of this result is that -as long as the number of employed household members is taken as a proxy for household income -the effect of job loss is significant only for households with lower income, i.e. those for which a negative economic shock is expected to be more binding. While the composition of the two sub-samples is endogenous, this result contributes to suggest a role of household income drop in explaining the effect of household head job loss on child school dropout.
------ [Table 11 here] ------Interestingly, the household income drop mechanism would also provide an explanation for why the effect is stronger for boys than for girls (see Section 5.4 and Table 8 ). One of the coping strategies for a household affected by a negative economic shock is to withdraw the child from school and make him/her generating additional income. Yet, in the context of the OPT, child labour is not an option for girls (Di Maio and Nandi, 2013) . In fact, our data indicate that more than 40% of boys who drop out of school start working, and the percentage increases to 47% for those aged 15 or above (i.e. after mandatory school is completed). Instead, less than 1% of girls who dropout of school start working. This evidence is also in line with the survey results reported in Sharek Youth Foundation (2009). Among the motivations for school dropout for male students, the economic ones are the most important: 38% of males report they dropped out of school because they had to support their household and 24% because they could no longer afford school. Instead, only 18% of females mention economic-related reasons (including school cost) for school dropout. The most significant motivation for female students is marriage (46%).
Taken together, this evidence indicates that household income loss is a possible mechanism behind the effect of parental job loss on child school dropout and that its impact is heterogeneous as for the gender of the child. In particular, the fact that Palestinian households are unlikely to resort to female work to generate additional income implies that -in line with the results in Table 8 -any given negative economic shock is more likely to increase the probability of school dropout for boys than for girls.
Other possible mechanisms
There are other possible mechanisms through which household head job loss may affect the child's probability of dropping out of school. Among the most important mechanisms related to the household environment, there are: family disruption (e.g. parental divorce) and residential relocation of the household (Stevens and Shaller, 2011) . To investigate these mechanisms, we make use of a series of variables from the PLFS for the period 2000-2006 and from the Child Labour Force Survey 2004 (PCBS, 2004) .
Family disruption One possible mechanism explaining the effect of household head job loss on child school dropout is the increase in family distress, possibly leading to family disruption, i.e. parental divorce. Charles and Stephens (2004) find an increase in the probability of divorce following layoffs, and numerous studies document the detrimental effect of divorce on children' academic achievement (Stevens and Shaller, 2011) . Reduced form results reported in Table   A .4 show that conflict intensity does not increase the probability of divorce for Palestinians employed in Israel. To corroborate this result, we also look at the data from the CLFS for 2004 which provides very detailed information on household structure. Again, we find that child school dropout probability is not correlated with the rate of parental divorce (results available upon request from the authors). While we cannot control for other possible intra-household effects, such as increase in stress and violence that may be associated with parental job loss, the available evidence induce us to exclude family disruption as potential mechanism explaining the effect of household head job loss on child school dropout.
Residential relocation As a consequence of the household head job loss, the household may decide to relocate. Yet, relocation can be a very exhausting experience and is often associated with increased psychological distress (McLanahan, 1983; Stevens and Shaller, 2011) . Moreover, even if relocation may be the optimal response from the point of view of the adults, this may create difficulties to the child's learning process, increasing the probability of grade repetition, and ultimately inducing the student to dropout of school. In fact, while residential relocation may be an important mechanisms in other contexts, this is not the case in the OPT during the Second Intifada. In fact, the whole period of the Second Intifada has been characterised by extremely low internal and external mobility rates (see also the evidence discussed in Section 4.2.1). Mobility across cities in Palestine was severely limited through different measures such as checkpoints and internal closures (Mansour, 2010; Cali and Miaari, 2013; Abrahams, 2015) .
Moreover, the conflict situation induced Israel to severely limit the international mobility of Palestinian households. Taken together, this evidence suggests that -at least in the case of the OPT -residential relocation is not a likely mechanism through which household head job loss affects child school dropout.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the effect of a negative household-level economic shock, namely the job loss faced by the household head, on child school dropout. To identify the effect of job loss, we focused on Palestinian workers employed in Israel during the Second Intifada (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) and implemented an instrumental variable strategy using workers' exposure to conflict as a source of exogenous variation in job loss. The size of the effect is large: household head job loss increases child's probability of dropping out of school by 9 percentage points. The effect varies with the gender, grade, and academic performance of the student, with the educational level of the household head, and with the number of children and employed members in the household.
We have also explored different possible mechanisms to explain the effect of household head job loss on school dropout decision. Our results indicate that the household income drop associated with the job loss is likely to be the main motivation behind the household decision to withdraw the child from school. We do not find evidence for job loss-induced parental divorce or household residential relocation as possible alternative explanations.
Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the effects of idiosyncratic negative economic shocks on investment education choices at the household level. In particular, we have documented that the household head job loss has an immediate negative impact by increasing the child's probability of school dropout. This result has important policy implications because school dropout is a difficult to revert outcome, especially in developing countries. Our results suggest that, where markets are imperfect and risk-mitigation policies are not effective, even possibly temporary and short-term negative economic shocks may be a serious obstacle to the process of human capital accumulation and thus have dramatic long-run effects on economic development.
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Household head job loss 0.009** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007* (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) Child gender (male) 0.003 0.003 0.003 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Child age 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Child years of schooling -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004** (0 Note: OLS regression results. The sample includes all Palestinian children aged 10-17 who at quarter t (the time of the first interview) are enrolled in school and have the household head employed in Israel. Child school dropout is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if a child is attending school in quarter t (the time of the first interview) and is not attending school in quarter t + 1 (the time of the second interview). Household head job loss is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the child's household head is employed in Israel in quarter t and is not employed in Israel in quarter t + 1. Household head-specific controls include household head age, age squared, a set of dummies for the level of education, and a set of dummies for the employment status. Household-specific controls include household size, number of children in the household, number of members employed in the household other than the household head, and type of residential location dummies (rural, urban, refugee camp). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. (Sources: Labour Force Survey -PCBS; B'TSELEM.) *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Note -OLS regression results. The sample includes all Palestinian children aged 10-17 who at quarter t (the time of the first interview) are enrolled in school and have the household head employed in Israel. The dependent variable is Child school dropout in the upper panel and Household head job loss in the lower panel, respectively. Child school dropout is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if a child is attending school in quarter t (the time of the first interview) and is not attending school in quarter t+1 (the time of the second interview). Household head job loss is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the child's household head is employed in quarter t and is not employed in quarter t + 1. The main explanatory variable, Fatalities, measures the district-level number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli Defence Forces per 10,000 inhabitants by quarter, and serves as instrumental variable. All controls include: 1) child-specific controls: gender, age, and years of schooling; 2) household head-specific controls: age, age squared, a set of dummies for the level of education, and a set of dummies for the employment status; 3) household-specific controls: size, number of children, number of members employed other than the household head, and type of residential location (rural, urban, refugee camp). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (Sources: Labour Force Survey -PCBS; B'TSELEM.) *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Note -OLS regression results. The sample includes all Palestinian children aged 10-17 who at quarter t (the time of the first interview) are enrolled in school and have the household head employed in Israel. The dependent variable, Household head job loss, is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the child's household head is employed in Israel in quarter t and is not employed in Israel in quarter t + 1. Fatalities: current quarter is the district-level number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli Defence Forces per 10,000 inhabitants in the quarter of the first interview. Fatalities: next quarter is the district-level number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli Defence Forces per 10,000 inhabitants in the quarter after that of the first interview. Fatalities: previous quarter is the district-level number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli Defence Forces per 10,000 inhabitants in the quarter before that of the first interview. All controls include: 1) child-specific controls: gender, age, and years of schooling; 2) household head-specific controls: age, age squared, a set of dummies for the level of education, and a set of dummies for the employment status; 3) household-specific controls: size, number of children, number of members employed other than the household head, and type of residential location (rural, urban, refugee camp). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (Sources: Labour Force Survey -PCBS; B'TSELEM.) *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. is defined in the same way but income is computed considering imputed wages for missing values. Wages are imputed in the following way. As for the wage level at the time of the first interview, we assign the worker the average wage level of Palestinian workers employed in Israel in the same industry, in the same quarter, and with the same level of education. As for the wage level at the time of the second interview, the imputation depends on the employment status. If he/she is employed in Israel, we impute the same wage level as in previous quarter. If he/she is re-employed in the OPT, we impute the average wage level of Palestinian workers employed in the OPT in the same industry, in the same quarter, and with the same level of education. Finally, if he/she is unemployed, we impute a zero wage. Household income (log) loss (imputed wages) measures the difference in the household income (computed considering imputed wages) between quarter t and quarter t + 1: it is then multiplied by -1 so as higher values capture higher income loss, and expressed in log terms. The main explanatory variable, Fatalities, measures the district-level number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli Defence Forces per 10,000 inhabitants by quarter, and serves as instrumental variable. All controls include: 1) child-specific controls: gender, age, and years of schooling; 2) household head-specific controls: age, age squared, a set of dummies for the level of education, and a set of dummies for the employment status; 3) household-specific controls: size, number of children, number of members employed other than the household head, and type of residential location (rural, urban, refugee camp). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (Sources: Labour Force Survey -PCBS; B'TSELEM.) *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. All controls include: 1) child-specific controls: gender, age, and years of schooling; 2) household head-specific controls: age, age squared, a set of dummies for the level of education, and a set of dummies for the employment status; 3) household-specific controls: size, number of children, number of members employed other than the household head, and type of residential location (rural, urban, refugee camp). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (Sources: Labour Force Survey -PCBS; B'TSELEM.) *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
Figure A.2: FALSIFICATION TEST
Notes -The figure depicts the probability density function of the coefficients of F atalities jt obtained by estimating the first-stage regression with the placebo fatalities as independent variable, and iterating 10,000 times. The vertical line indicates our true point-estimate (0.053), which is reported in column (1) of Table 4 . Note -2SLS regression results. The sample includes all Palestinian children aged 10-17 who at quarter t (the time of the first interview) are enrolled in school and have the household head employed in Israel. The dependent variable is Child school dropout, a dummy variable which takes value 1 if a child is attending school in quarter t (the time of the first interview) and is not attending school in quarter t + 1 (the time of the second interview). The main explanatory variable, Household head job loss, is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the child's household head is employed in Israel in quarter t and is not employed in Israel in quarter t + 1. The instrumental variable used in first-stage regression, Fatalities, measures the district-level number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli Defence Forces per 10,000 inhabitants by quarter. All controls include: 1) childspecific controls: gender, age, and years of schooling; 2) household head-specific controls: age, age squared, a set of dummies for the level of education, and a set of dummies for the employment status; 3) household-specific controls: size, number of children, number of members employed other than the household head, and type of residential location (rural, urban, refugee camp). Nonlinearities in all controls are addressed by including the quadratic terms of all continuous control variables and all the two-way interactions between the dummy control variables. Nonlinearities in IV used in first-stage regression are addressed by including the quadratic term of Fatalities as additional instrument in first-stage regression. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (Sources: Labour Force Survey -PCBS; BTSELEM.) *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
Household head job loss 0.064** 0.054* 0.053** 0.051** (0.030) (0.031) (0.025) (0.024) Child gender (male) 0.003* 0.003* 0.003 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Child age 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Child years of schooling -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) Household-specific Note -2SLS regression results. The sample includes all Palestinian children aged 10-17 who at quarter t (the time of the first interview) are enrolled in school and have the household head employed in Israel. The dependent variable is Child school dropout, a dummy variable which takes value 1 if a child is attending school in quarter t (the time of the first interview) and is not attending school in quarter t + 1 (the time of the second interview). The main explanatory variable, Household head job loss, is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the child's household head is employed in Israel in quarter t and is not employed in Israel in quarter t + 1. The instrumental variable used in firststage regression is the predicted household head job loss obtained from a probit model of Household head job loss on Fatalities and all controls, where Fatalities measures the district-level number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli Defence Forces per 10,000 inhabitants by quarter. Household headspecific controls include: age, age squared, a set of dummies for the level of education, and a set of dummies for the employment status. Household-specific controls include: size, number of children, number of members employed other than the household head; and type of residential location (rural, urban, refugee camp). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. (Sources: Labour Force Survey -PCBS; BTSELEM.) *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Note -OLS regression (reduced-form) results. The dependent variable, Parental divorce, is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the household head face a divorce from quarter t (the time of the first interview) to quarter t + 1 (the time of the second interview). The main explanatory variable, Fatalities, measures the district-level number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli Defence Forces per 10,000 inhabitants by quarter, and serves as instrumental variable. All controls include: 1) child-specific controls: gender, age, and years of schooling; 2) household head-specific controls: age, age squared, a set of dummies for the level of education, and a set of dummies for the employment status; 3) household-specific controls: size, number of children, number of members employed other than the household head, and type of residential location (rural, urban, refugee camp). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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